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Abstract 
The paper examines determinants of the EU‘s FDI into the China by using a newly available 
Manufacturing firm-level data set for the period 1998-2007 from the State Statistical Bureau of 
China. The theoretical framework of the  paper builds on Dunning's ownership–location–
internalization (OLI) paradigm, incorporating the institutional determinants to test  international 
production by EU firms in emerging market. The paper analyses recent trends and patterns of EU 
FDI and its firms‘ characteristics in China. This study applies both static and dynamic panel data 
approaches (fixed effects and GMM system estimators) to test the presence of agglomeration 
effect of past FDI. It finds that EU FDI in China is positively associated with export intensity and 
labour cost. However, technology and profitability of the firm show unexpected results, not lining 
with theory in the study. The results further suggest that locational factors with regard to 
macroeconomic and legal environment are also considered by EU firms when deciding on FDI in 
China. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policymaking.  
 
Keywords: Keywords: EU firms; China; Foreign direct investment; Eclectic paradigm; Dynamic 
panel data analysis 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Foreign direct investment (FDI) as in international trade is one channel for the liberalisation of the 
world economy (Rugman and Verbeke 2008). Multinational enterprises look for host countries/ 
new markets because these enterprises seek to acquire localization advantages, and to benefit from 
specific advantages. The reasons are explained by the OLI paradigm (ownership-location –
internalization) of Dunning (1992, 2003), Dunning and Lundan (2008, 2009, 2010), and Dunning 
and Fortanier (2007). 
The People‘s Republic of China1( (China or PRC) has become the most comparative advantage a 
manufacturing location(Chen et al., 2002; Rowen, 2003; European Commission, 2007:4 ) and  the 
top Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) destination among all developing countries and remained 
host to the world‘s largest share of FDI receipts since its accession to the WTO in 2001.  FDI  
developments  were character by trends with these aspects regarding the policy: entry modes
2
, 
ideological breakthroughs, governing laws, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
3
 with ‗special 
policies‘ and ‗flexible measures‘4.During the period 1983-20085, both the contractual value and 
the realised value of FDI in China increased by more than 112 times and 117 times respectively 
from US$1,732 million to US$ 193,727 million and from US$ 636 million to US$ 74, 767.89 
million (MOFTEC, 2009). More details see Figure 1.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure1:  FDI in China 1983-2008 (Unit: US$10, 000)       
             Source: Compiled by the author according to FDI Statistics from Ministry of     
                       Commerce of the PRC (MOFTEC) 
                                                 
1
 Unless otherwise stated,  ‗China‘ refers to Mainland China, which does not cover Hong Kong, Macau and Taiwan, 
where different economic and legal systems are in operation, despite the fact that they are legally recognized as 
indispensable parts of the State of China.  
2
 China promulgated the Chinese-Foreign Equity joint Venture Law (EJVL) in 1979, WFOEs in 1986 and CJVs in 
1988. 
3
 The first four SEZs were Zhenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province. In 
the 1990s, Hainan Province as a whole and Pudong New District in Shanghai were granted the same status, as were 
21 cities along the Yangtze River and in the Northeast. 
4
 The ‗special policies‘ and ‗flexible measures‘ can be interpreted as  special privileges and treatment for foreigners 
investing in these zones,  where they could carry out investment and trading activities that were not allowed in th e 
rest of the country , or were allowed but with less favourable conditions.   
5
 Though China began to receive FDI from 1979, official data on inward FDI by country of origin are available only 
from 1983 onwards. 
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China‘s quest for sustainable growth continues to stimulate much discussion and vigorous debate 
among academics (Wei, 1995; Borensztein, de Gregorio, & Lee, 1998; Wu, 1999; Wei & Liu, 
2001; Graham & Wada, 2001; Whalley & Xin, 2006; Tuan & Ng, 2004, 2007; Tuan& Ng, 2006; 
Yao & Wei, 2007). The fascinating developments in China‘s globalization also provide us with a 
tempting opportunity to study the determinants of inward FDI in China. 
The European Union
6
 (the EU)
 7
   and China have everything to gain by strengthening their trade 
and investment ties. Since 1978, EU-China trade has increased more than 60-fold and reached 
around €254 billion in 2006 (Eurostat) 8. EU investment in China has increased more than 25-fold 
since 1986 and in 2000 the EU became the largest foreign investor in China (Figure 2: EU 
Investment in China 1986-2008). During the period 1986-2008, EU realised FDI in China 
increased from US$ 178.53 million to US$ 4994.51 million (MOFTEC. 2009). The number of EU 
DI projects rose from 1002 to 1844 (MOFTEC, 2009). For details see Figure 2. 
 
Figure2: EU Realized FDI & Number of Projects in China 1986-2008 (Source: MOFTEC) 
 Source: Compiled by the author according to FDI Statistics from Ministry of     
                       Commerce of the PRC (MOFTEC) 
                                                 
6
  In this study, we look EU as an individual country because of the data source available.  
7
 On 29 Jan 2009, the European Union realised its sixth enlargement and become a union of 27 member states, 
including   2 new member states. 
8
 Quoted in European Commission External  Trade Website: 
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/issues/bilateral/countries/china/index_en.htm [Accessed 7 January 2009].  
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European companies
9
 invested €4.5 billion in China in 2008 (down from €7, 1 billion in 2007). 
Chinese companies invested €0, 1 billion in Europe in 2008 (down from €0, 6 billion in 2007), 
bringing stocks of EU FDI to over USD 35 billion
10
. Almost half of EU foreign direct investment 
to China goes to manufacturing. Overall, after three decades of evolution. EU-China foreign direct 
investment relations reached a new milestone:  China is now the EU's second largest trading 
partner behind the USA and the biggest source of imports. The EU is China's biggest trading 
partner. The strong growth of FDI has led to extensive research on its determinants, looking at 
developed countries, developing countries or country groups using cross-section, time-series or 
panel data. Despite the considerable amount of research that has been undertaken, the EU and 
China, as two of the largest, mutually complementary markets in the world, which  represent a 
major FDI recipient and a region with a substantial share of foreign ownership,  have  been largely 
overlooked in terms of a comprehensive economic analysis
11
. The available empirical evidence on 
the major determinants of EU FDI inflows into China, especially at the firm level
12
, is rather scant 
in the literature and, at best, only under preliminary discussion. As an exception, Wei (2006) and  
Wei and O‘ Callaghan (2008) provide an econometric analysis of factors influencing EU foreign 
capital inflows into China at province level using ordinary least squares regression with a focus on  
locational determinants . Time-series data for the period 1996-2002 are analysed. Their study 
suffers from problems of inconsistencies in some numerical results, a short time span and a lack of 
degrees of freedom. Bulcke (2003) examines provide European Union direct investment in China 
during the period 1979-1996 using statistical analysis of  location-specific factors with a focus on 
characteristics, challenges and perspectives.  The research question is to evaluate which factors 
determine the   EU foreign direct investment in China. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify the major determinants of FDI inflows into China from the 
EU firm during the last 10 years. The paper aims to fill in the gap currently existing in the 
literature of FDI from EU in China. The objective of the study is to investigate 697 EU firms 
investing in China manufacturing industries for the period 1998-2007, employing the eclectic 
paradigm of Dunning together with incorporation institutional factors in EU FDI OLI framework. 
We develop an integrated framework that combines elements of the theories. In doing so, this 
study adopts both static and dynamic models to investigate FDI determinants, and to test the 
presence of the agglomeration effect of past FDI.  It also takes a step forward adding dynamic 
analysis in EU firms FDI in China to enhance the robustness of the paradigm. This contributes is 
to literature on EU FDI in China with updated data.  
Some key results emerge from the analysis: age does not have a significant positive impact on EU 
FDI in China. R & D and capital have  positive,  significant and U –shaped  effect  on EU FDI 
expansion in China, but technology has  negative and significant effects as EU FDI flows in China 
show  few very high-technology investments  and patents in the last ten years. Product innovation 
is negative and highly significant after GMM test, showing low-level technology products 
upgraded. Profitability has a negative and significant correlation with FDI, which means EU FDI 
is market- seeking rather than effect-seeking and its products are capital –intensive and R & D-
based industries.  Personal capital share is highly negative and significant, showing the EU‘s FDI 
entry mode is from Joint venture (JV) to WFOES according to China‘s FDI policy. Rule of law is 
highly negative and significant because of IPR infringement and government intervention.  
                                                 
9
 Detailed discussion of  FDI by EU firms in China is in section 3. 
10
 European Commission External Trade Website, 2009 
11
 also figures A1, A2 and A3 in our appendix 
1212
 Regarding the FDI statistics at country level, a database of foreign registered enterprise was established on the 
basis of information from MOFTEC‘s list of foreign subsidiaries (MOFTEC‘s). However, MOFTEC stopped the  
publication of this type of information in its statistical yearbook as of 1998. 
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The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the literature review and 
hypothesis formation. Section 3 discusses the methods and data. Section 4 presents the results. 
The last section concludes the paper.  
2. THEORY DEVELOPMENT AND HYPOTHESES  
2.1 Literature Review: The Eclectic Paradigm (OLI) 
Dunning's eclectic paradigm (Dunning,. 1976, 1977, 1981a, 1988, 1993a, 2000, 2001; Dunning & 
Lundan, 2009), known as the ―Ownership, Location, Internalization‖ (OLI) model, has been the 
most influential framework for empirical investigation of determinants of FDI for three decades. 
(Narula, 2006; Cleeve, 2007; Stoian and Filippaios, 2008; Buckley and Hashai, 2008; Stefanović, 
2008; Piteil and Teece, 2010). The paradigm draws upon, and synthesizes of industrial 
organization theories (Hymer, 1960; Kindelberge, 1969; Caves 1974), Internalization Theory 
(Buckley & Casson, 1976; Hennart, 1991; Dunning & Rugman, 1985; Teece, 1981, Buckley, 
1989), and industrial location (Dunning, 1988). It is, however, arguable that limitations in 
dynamic components have discouraged the leveraging of recent scholarly developments in 
organization theory and strategic management. Indeed, OLI has been extended to accommodate 
several criticisms (Cantwell & Narula, 2001; Dunning, 2001; Estrella Tolentino, 2001;Dunning, 
Pak, & Beldona, 2007;Piteil and Teece, 2010). The present study is  based on  Dunning (extended) 
OLI eclectic paradigm( 1977, 1988a, 1988b, 2000, 2001, 2004a, 2004b, 2008a.),  and expands it 
by incorporating institutional theory in the choice of the location advantage variables; such  
institutional determinants can be both firm as well as country-specific (Dunning 2000, 2006, 
Dunning Lundan, 2008b, 2009, 2010 ). We develop an integrated framework that combines 
elements of the FDI and MNE theory. In doing so, the study not only employs the static analysis, 
but also takes a step forward by adding dynamic analysis in EU firms FDI in China to enhance the 
robustness of the paradigm.  
The paradigm offers a holistic framework in take into consideration all the important factors that 
influence the decisions of MNCs about going international in production and other operations, 
which will drive their growth (Dunning 2008; Stefanović, 2008). The basic proposition of the 
eclectic paradigm of international production (EPIP) (Dunning 2000, 1995, 1993a, 1988, 1977, 
1976) is that the pattern of international production is determined by three groups of advantages: 
the ownership-specific (O) advantages (in accordance with industrial organization theory) refer to 
unique competitive advantages, indicating who is going to produce abroad ‗and for that matter, 
other forms of international activity‘ (Dunning, 1993a, 1993b).  Locational (L) advantages 
(according to conventional trade theory), refer to ―pull factors‖ and ―push factors‖, influencing 
where to produce‘ (Dunning, 1993a 1993b). Internalisation (I) advantage (in accordance with the 
Internalization theory), refers to the perceived advantage of hierarchical control of value-added 
activities to overcome market imperfections. The market imperfection could be structured or 
transactional, addressing the question of why firms engage in FDI rather than license foreign firms 
to use their proprietary assets (Dunning 1993a, 1993b). A decade ago Dunning (1993a) added a 
fourth possible condition to OLI variables. This related to the long-term strategy of the MNE and 
its decision to produce abroad with a given OLI configuration. Additionally, with the advent of 
‗alliance capitalism‘, the EPIP is bound to change in several directions (Dunning, 1995) such as 
the role of innovation, strategic alliance and collaborative agreements. Using the above 
propositions, one can explain the scope and geography of international value-added activities. We 
briefly review those factors and several criticisms of the OLI below. 
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The essential condition for a firm to invest abroad is to possess ownership advantages 
(competitive or monopolistic advantage). Hymer first conceived the general theory of FDI in 1960 
in his market imperfection theory. Cave (1974) developed the oligopolistic power theory of 
Hymer by adding the concept of transaction costs. Hymer saw FDI as a means of transferring 
knowledge and other firm assets, both tangible and tacit, in order to organize production abroad. 
In a similar way, Vernon‘s product life cycle (1966) was developed from Hymer‘s thesis to add a 
dynamic dimension. These two seminal pieces spawned numerous contributions to explain FDI 
and MNE activities from different theoretical bases (Sethi, 2003). However, Ownership advantage 
has not been without its critics. Whether the changing character and boundaries of the O specific 
advantages of firms can be satisfactorily incorporated into the eclectic paradigm, the last two 
decades have been the increasing significance of FDI based on the possession of, or need to 
acquire, dynamic and alliance related O advantages (Dunning, 1995, 2000, 2006). Early attempts 
to look at MNE and FDI through a dynamic lens were the Upsaala model (Johnson and Vahlne, 
1977, 2009) which posits that MNEs engage in FDI incrementally, the resource-based approach 
(Conner, 1991; Wernerfelt, 1984), the evolutionary perspective (Nelson and Winter, 1982; 
Cantwell 1989, 1994; Teece et al., 1997) and the organizational (management related) approach 
(Prahalad and Doz 1987; Bartlett and Ghoshal, 1989; Sethi and Guisinger, 2002).  These theories 
explain how MNEs transfer them through FDI with dynamic evolution of ownership advantages 
to sustain these advantages by leveraging them through worldwide investments. 
 
The internalisation factor (I) of the OLI paradigm  has been defined by Dunning (1993a) and 
Dunning (1993b)  as a choice between investing abroad or licensing a firm to exploit O 
advantages possessed by the licensor. The concept of ―internalisation‖ stems from transaction cost 
theory, originally suggested by Coase (1937) and taken further by Williamson (1975; 1985). 
Based on the logic of the theory, Buckley and Casson (1976) first attempted to elucidate why 
MNEs emerge and embark upon FDI, thereby extending transaction cost economics to the realm 
of internationalisation of the firm (Madhok, 1998; Rugman, 1986). 
Internalization theory has long provided one of the main theoretical rationales for the existence of 
the multinational enterprise (Buckley and Roger, 2010). Yet it has not gone unchallenged. The 
major criticisms are that it is an incomplete theory, which less comfortably with the conception of 
a firm as a ‗repository of knowledge and capabilities‘ (Kogut & Zander, 1994; Madhok, 1996). 
The second criticism of orthodox internalization theory is that it is a static theory, although a 
dynamic element can be introduced by incorporating an analysis of the innovation process 
(Buckley and Casson, 1976, pp. 34–86). Asmittedly, by shifting international business literature 
from a limited focus on country-specific factors into an emphasis on industry-level and firm-level 
factors of international investment flows (Henisz, 2003), the internalisation theory has made an 
important contribution to international business literature. However, despite its sound explanatory 
power of MNE behaviour relating to cost considerations, the theory still does not give a clear 
answer to the question of why MNEs engage in FDI and international production and why they 
choose a particular foreign location in which to invest. 
 
Locational advantage explains which activities of firm are best undertaken in particular countries 
based on the comparative costs and benefits in different locations (Dunning, 1993a), Building on 
existing literature on the combination of location and international trade theory (e.g., Buckley and 
Casson, 1976), Dunning (1977, 1988) expands this idea, placing it in the eclectic paradigm. The 
location-specific advantages are relevant initially to showing that geographical location matters to 
economic outcomes. In more detail, a firm must possess ownership-specific advantages over rival 
firms in foreign markets. When market structure is perceived as imperfect, the firm attempts to 
internalise its proprietary advantages via FDI, thereby becoming a MNE. An MNE may derive 
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specific benefits from a unique set of advantages possessed by each host country. They are 
classified into four categories (Dunning, 1993): natural resource advantages (e.g., raw material 
and energy); economic environment advantages (e.g., market size and R&D facilities); cultural 
and social advantages (e.g., culture and language) and political power and legal environment (e.g., 
political stability and legal environment). These international locations are becoming a key 
consideration for their additional strategic importance. For example, they can be taken into 
account as a target of exploitation for the supply and demand in foreign markets (Dunning and 
Lundan, 2008; Pak and Park, 2005). Most of these studies are more relevant to initial market entry, 
and do not analyse FDI trends dynamically. Research on the investment development path, 
however, does have a longitudinal element (Dunning, 1981, 1986; Ozawa, 1992; Narula, 1996; 
Tolentino, 1992; Dunning and Narula, 1996). This perspective shows how the type of FDI 
changes with the stage of economic development of the host country (Sethi, 2003) 
 
Regarding the location advantages put forward by Dunning (2001, 2006), due to its emphasis on 
static market failure, the eclectic paradigm has been criticized as lacking dynamism.  One of the 
major modifications of OLI by Guisinger (2001, p265) is the adaptation of the firm‘s operations to 
the international business environment building on institutional theory. Following from North 
( 1990, 2005), the environment can consist of institutional rules, regulations, cultures and 
exchange rates and other elements which are geographically bound and usually, but not always, 
follow national boundaries.  Many previous studies on transition economies have identified 
institutional environment variables as significant determinants of FDI (Dimelis & Louri, 2002; 
Fan et, al, 2009), the incorporation of institutional variables into firms‘ decision to internationalise 
firstly and then internalise comes from the property rights theory, showing that the different 
ownership structures adopted by MNEs, when enaging FDI, demonstrate a way of protecting their 
property rights, their reputation or other intangible assets. The institutional environment, 
especially through exchange rate, corruption, and practically the rule of law, can force firms to 
adopt particular ownership or other non-equity structures. This present study focuses on what 
factors determine EU firms‘ investment in China. Despite China's rapid development and 
increasing openness, the absence of transparency and institutional trust is widespread (Redding & 
Witt, 2007). The Chinese market differs from most other markets because of the active role that 
the Chinese government plays in business processes (Witt, 2008). Multinational firms have, one 
after another, set up special units to deal with government relationships (Faure and Fang, 2008; 
Tung et al.2008).They force the investing firms to think strategically about how to avoid the 
limitation imposed by domestic laws as well as how to reap the benefits that the law and particular 
circumstances are capable of providing‘ (Spar, 2001, European Union, 2007:4). 
Based on the existing literature, we develop an integrated research framework that combines 
elements of updated Dunning‗s OLI with a dynamic interpretation 13 . Figure 3 presents the 
research framework. We now introduce the hypotheses and the choice of antecedent variables.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
13
 Institutions and development (e.g. North, 1994) led to cross-fertilisation between international business scholarship and development 
and institutional economics (Dunning, 2006; Cantwell et al., 2009; Dunning and Lundan, 2010). 
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                 Figure 3.Determinants of EU FDI in the OLI framework  
 
2.2 Determinants of EU FDI in China: hypotheses  
We now review determinants of FDI derived from theory and hypothesise on their ability to 
influence the factors of EU FDI in China.  
2.2.1 Ownership advantages  
Seven variables were used to measure ownership advantages:  
       Capital intensity 
 
This would possibly give companies superior product quality and cost advantages in 
export markets (Lin, 2010; Siddharthan and Nollen, 2004). Previous studies found that companies 
with higher capital intensity have a higher propensity to engage in FDI (e.g., Roberts and Tybout, 
1997). Capital intensity of firms is relevant in deciding FDI levels because the size of the resource 
commitments needed to engage in FDI can vary considerably between less capital intensive and 
more capital-intensive firms (Lin, 2010). Thus, we expect a direct link between capital intensity 
and FDI. Capital intensity is measured in this study by the natural logarithm of the ratio of fixed 
assets to the number of employees. We posit that: 
Hypothesis 1.  There is a positive relationship between capital intensity of EU firms and their FDI 
engagement in China. 
Ownership 
advantages 
Location 
advantage---
location institutional 
variables  
Location 
advantages—
location economic 
variable 
econom 
Internalization 
advantages 
Static analysis 
Fixed effects estimates 
Event analysis (WTO) 
Dynamic analysis 
General analysis 
Specially analysis 
Determinants of 
EU firms FDI in 
China 
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       Firm size  
Firm size has proved to be an important predictor of FDI activities (e.g., Blomstrom and 
Lipsey, 1989). Developing countries' MNEs need asset advantages to engage in foreign operation 
and to compete successfully with indigenous firms. The size of a firm reflects its capability to 
engage in these types of activities (Buckley and Casson, 1976). Further, the larger the firm grows 
relative to the domestic market, the less profitable it would be to increase its domestic share 
relative to expanding abroad. According to Dunning (1993), size is a transaction cost minimiser. 
Much empirical evidence accentuates the impact of firm size on FDI as very positive (e.g., Culem, 
1988; Grubaugh, 1987; Kimura, 1989). Blomstrom and Lipsey (1991), however, found no link 
between FDI and size. Their study in the U.S. found that this was not only true for the 
manufacturing as a whole, but for seven sub-industries as well. They concluded that, once a firm 
jumps the initial barrier to foreign production, firm size is important only as a threshold effect and 
has no effect in the magnitude of the firm‘s resources devoted to overseas production. Pradhan 
(2004) argues that FDI and size may be linked non-monotonically due to monopolistic advantage 
such that FDI first increases with size but then decreases after the threshold point. In this study, 
we empirically examine the presence of such non-linearities. 
. Due to their large capacities, large firms should be more able to combine resources 
outside their national markets and may therefore pursue more than one objectives at the same time. 
In this study, we use the natural logarithm of total assets as the measure of firm size.  We 
hypothesise that: Hypothesis 2. The larger an EU firm's size, the more it will engage in FDI in 
China. 
       Export intensity 
Concerning trade and FDI, the empirical evidence suggests that the two are complements 
(Drake and Caves, 1992). FDI is the combination of an investor‘s firm-specific advantages with a 
host country‘s site-specific advantage. Dunning (1998) suggests that the relationship between 
trade and FDI is conditional on the type of trade and FDI, and the conditions under which each 
takes place. Gray (1998) indicates that market-seeking production affiliates can displace 
international trade and efficiency-seeking production affiliates will increase the volume of trade. 
An evolutionary model of trade and investment emphasizes that a firm first gains a 
foothold in the host country‘s market by exporting its product. Only when the firm accumulates 
sufficient information through its export experience, that profitable opportunities exist for 
investment, does there in fact exist a statistically significant relationship between previous export 
and the initial FDI decisions from the EU firm or export from the EU to the host country. Export 
intensity is measured by export sales over total sales .Lin (2010) and Trevino and Daniels (1994) 
argue that FDI and export orientation are directly linked. Thus, we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 3. The higher an EU firm's export intensity, the more it will engage in FDI in China. 
       Age  
This factor has been considered in past studies (e.g., Lall, 1980). Also, Lin et al. (2005) 
report a positive correlation between age and FDI. However, firm age (AGE) may have a non-
monotonic relation with FDI (Pradhan, 2004). That is, the link can be positive for younger firms 
but then the association turns negative for older firms. Luo et al. (2009), for instance, report an 
inverse link between age and FDI. To account for this possibility, we also test for any non-linear 
effect of Age by including its quadratic term Age
2
 in our regression model. Age is measured by 
the natural logarithm of the number of years an EU firm has been in China. Luo et al. (2008) 
argue that the earlier an MNE entered China the more investment it is likely to make. Hence, we 
hypothesise that: Hypothesis 4. The more years an EU firm has experienced, the more likely it is 
to engage in FDI in China.  
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     Profitability  
Companies with high profitability should manage their activities more efficiently but also 
create the resources necessary for future expansion (Cantwell and Sanna-Randaccio, 1993). 
Therefore, one can expect that high profitability will increase the probability of internationalising 
the market, which is empirically confirmed by Lien et al. (2005) and Luo et al. (2009). The 
argument, however, may work in the opposite direction (Stoian and Filippaios, 2008): More 
profitable firms prefer less risk when investing abroad and hence might choose to invest in non-
equity participation (see Barbosa and Louri, 2002; Dimelis and Louri, 2002). 
Hymer and Rowthorn (1970) demonstrated that more profitable U.S. MNEs invested 
internationally to a greater degree than their less profitable European and Japanese counterparts. 
The authors posited that increased financial strength would be a prerequisite to European and 
Japanese expansion in the U.S. This proposition was confirmed using secondary data for Japanese 
manufacturing investment in the U.S. (Trevino and Daniels, 1994; Tan and Vertinsky, 1996). We 
measure firm profitability as operating profits over total assets and hypothesise that: H5. Firms 
with greater profitability will have greater FDI in China. 
     Labour cost  
Labour cost is an important component of total production cost and therefore it is expected 
that high labour cost would discourage FDI inflow. Caves (1974) found a significant relationship, 
indicating that lower cost enhances the promotion of FDI. Schneider and Frey (1985), in a cross-
country study of 54 developing countries, found a significantly negative relationship between 
labour cost and FDI flows. Gupta (1983) showed that wages do not significantly influence FDI 
flow into Canadian industry. Agodo (1978) found that the low cost of African labour had no 
significant effect on FDI flows from the U.S. FDI is concentrated in products where MNEs have 
relatively more ownership-specific advantages than the location-specific advantages of host 
countries such as cheaper labour in less developed countries. In our study, labour cost is measured 
as the natural logarithm of real wages. We hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 6. The higher the labour cost an EU firm has, the more it will engage in FDI in China. 
Seven variables were used to measure ownership advantages.  
2.2.2 Internalization advantages  
Five variables were used to measure Internalization advantages: 
   R&D intensity  
Buckley and Casson showed that MNEs that were active in research and development 
(R&D) intensive industries had a higher degree of internalisation.
14
A significant factor in market-
seeking internationalisation is the level of innovation and R&D allowing a firm to exploit the 
ownership advantages connected to the accumulation of technological competence and expertise. 
The hypothesis of a positive link between R&D and the propensity to undertake FDI has been 
extensively tested and confirmed (e.g., Grubaugh, 1987; Lall, 1980; Lin, 2010; Lin and Yeh, 2005; 
Markusen, 1995). They argue that, since the production processes, factor intensities and raw 
materials in the host country are different from those in the FDI source country, some of the R&D 
adopted is essential to modify technologies to suit local conditions. The R&D-generated 
knowledge at home tends to supply the overseas production.  
Conversely, concerning labour-seeking investments, the literature generally indicates a 
negative relationship as the international delocalisation in search of low labour costs is less likely 
for firms basing their competitive advantages essentially on product and process innovation. As 
regards resource-seeking investments, the empirical evidence seems to suggest a negative link 
                                                 
14
 Casson (1979 and 1983) later continued to formalise the MNE structure, while Buckley (1985) studied contract types, including 
wholly-owned subsidiaries, joint ventures, foreign minority holdings, licensing, franchising, management contract and 
subcontracting, in more detail. 
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(Dunning, 1993). This paper considers these conflicting arguments and hence empirically 
examines the presence of a non-linear link between FDI and R&D. In this study, R&D is 
measured as the ratio of intangible assets to total assets. We hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis7. The higher the R&D expenditure, the more the EU firm will engage in FDI in China. 
   Technology 
Recent theoretical work has given renewed impetus to something long recognised in the 
literature that a possible motive for FDI is not to exploit proprietary technology, but to access it. 
Thus, technology sourcing may be the motive for FDI. The literature on the internationalization of 
R&D suggests that this concern may be well placed (Cantwell and Janne, 1999; Patel and Vega, 
1999). The evidence suggests that corporations are increasingly moving their R&D facilities 
abroad as part of a strategic move away from merely adapting ‗core‘ technology to a foreign 
market towards a much more central role in product innovation and development. 
Technology sourcing is not a new phenomenon, and the recent upsurge in international 
R&D may be an indicator of production-oriented FDI flows which have already taken place. The 
literature on the internationalization of R&D is concerned principally with the establishment of 
new facilities in foreign countries, while that on technology sourcing as a motivation for FDI is 
concerned with real international resource flows. The evidence from developed countries reveals a 
strong association between R&D and overseas investment at both industry and firm levels (Lall, 
1980; Trevino and Daniels, 1994). We use the natural logarithm of intangible assets as a proxy for 
technology and hypothesise that: Hypothesis 8. The more technology an EU firm owns, the more it 
will engage in FDI in China  
    Personal share ownership 
 
An MNE has two options when determining the foreign affiliate‘s ownership structure: full 
ownership (wholly owned subsidiaries) or shared ownership (equity joint venture, EJV). The 
equity modes involve higher resource commitment and higher levels of control (Hill et al., 2006). 
Developing country MNEs with low-technology undifferentiated products have a high propensity 
to form joint ventures because they need a local partner to provide knowledge of local marketing 
skills, raw material sources, and the business environment (Lecraw, 1977). European firms used 
EJV more frequently as a form of entry for their operations in China than others (Bulcke et al., 
2003). EU foreign participation in China manufacturing is large and well dispersed across the 
industry. China‘s labour costs are far lower than those in the developed world and thus firms have 
both the incentive and time to adapt their techniques so that if multinationals adapt to conditions 
in less developed countries we should be able to observe such adaptation in China. We define a 
firm‘s ownership structure according to its official registration status. There are six ownership 
structures in this study‘s dataset: state capital; collective capital; corporate capital; personal capital; 
Hong Kong, Macao and Taiwan capital; and foreign capital. EU firms have a relatively small 
amount of personal share inflows into China. Issues such as the role of joint ventures imply that 
ownership at corporate or institutional level would be more effective to promote FDI. Thus, we 
hypothesise that: Hypothesis 9. The higher the personal participation, the less FDI will be 
exploited in China.  
   Advertising intensity 
The propensity of firms to affect market seeking investments may be higher in sectors where 
sales are supported by intense advertising campaigns. Firms from developed countries tend to 
spend more on advertising to enhance goodwill and reputation in term of product image and brand 
identities. Developing countries‘ MNEs usually do not have ownership advantages based on 
product differentiation and do not seem to require a substantial investment in advertising to 
DRAFT – Please do not cite or circulate without permission of the author 
 
 
differentiate their products from those of their competitors since the goods marketed are low-to-
medium quality, labour-intensive, and price sensitive. A significantly positive relation with the 
propensity to internationalisation of production has been found in many cases (e.g., Caves, 1974; 
Grubaugh, 1987; Lall, 1980). This factor serves as a proxy for a firm's ability to differentiate its 
products from those of its competitors, which is measured in this study by the advertising 
expenditures to sales. Thus, we hypothesise that: Hypothesis 10. The more an EU firm advertises, 
the more that firm will engage in FDI in China. 
   Product innovation 
The dominant model of FDI in 1960s was based on the ‗product cycle‘ paradigm (Vernon, 
1971). This suggests that product innovation would take place in the home country, with foreign 
markets initially entered by means of exports. Eventually, production would move to lower-cost 
locations as firm-specific knowledge came to be acquired by competitors. For a single product 
firm, foreign investment was thus viewed as a substitute for trade expertise and process 
innovations. A foreign capital inflow through an acquisition, joint venture, or some other form of 
capital transfer may lead to the installation of the foreign technology in the state-owned 
enterprises. Both of these processes could manifest themselves in increasing innovative activity. 
However, as multinationals generally undertake their innovative activity in the headquarters, large 
inflows of foreign capital may actually be expected to reduce innovative activity, as these 
functions may be redirected to the parent company‘s home country. In this study, product 
innovation is measured as the natural logarithm of output involving new product innovation. 
Following Trevino and Grosse (2002), we hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 11. The better an EU firm's production innovation, the greater the rate of conducting 
FDI in China. 
   Financing structure 
It is not clear how firms‘ debt ratios affect their FDI decisions. One can expect a positive 
link between leverage and FDI due to the diversification strategies as more levered firms would be 
more motivated to diversify their risk (Lien et al., 2005; Trevino and Grosse, 2002). Tan and 
Vertinsky (1996) also considered this liquidity issue but reported the insignificance of this factor 
on FDI decisions. On the other hand, it may be that less levered firms are financially more robust 
and hence more confident in taking on more growth projects in the international markets. This 
inverse relation is empirically reported by Luo et al. (2009) for US and Japanese firms, and Stoian 
and Filippaios (2008) for Greek firms. In a more related study, Forssbaeck and Oxelheim (2008) 
investigated in detail the effects of finance-specific variables on FDI, and argue the  financing mix 
of MNEs is particularly important if they operate in emerging countries. We measure leverage as 
the ratio of total liabilities to total assets and hypothesise that: 
Hypothesis 12. The EU firms with higher debt ratios will invest less in China. 
 
2.2.3 Location-economic advantages 
Three variables were used to measure Location-economic advantages: 
Openness  
Since we consider that Chinese FDI is market driven, market openness has to be considered 
alongside market size. It is a standard hypothesis that openness promotes FDI. This proxy is also 
important for foreign direct investors who are motivated by the export market. For instance 
investments in manufacturing and technologically intensive industries enhance technological 
spillovers and foster employment.  In the literature, the ratio of trade to GDP is often used as a 
measure of openness of a country and is also often interpreted as a measure of trade restrictions.  
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Empirical evidences (Jun and Singh, 1996) exist to back up the hypothesis that higher levels of 
exports lead to higher FDI inflows.  We therefore include Trade/GDP in the regression to examine 
the impact of openness on FDI. Market openness has been found to be important for FDI flows in 
numerous studies, such as Kravis and Lipsey (1982), Pistoresi (2000), Aizenman and Spiegel 
(2006) and Buch et al. (2005). As a result, we suggest, 
H1 3: the higher quality Rule law and lower Corruption in China, the more  EU FDI flows into 
China).  
GDP. GDPPC  
We measure market size by a few different indicators. The first (LNGDP) is the natural logarithm 
of GDP in billion US$. We also use the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (GDPPC) in 1000 
US$, and GDP growth (GDPGW) as alternatives to indicate market size. GDP is a significant 
positive estimator of both China‘s FDI (Duanmu and Guney, 2009), GDP is proxy as Natural 
logarithm of gross domestic product of China, and GDPPC is definite as GDP per capita in China 
The FDI decisions of EU firms could also be related to external factors such as the legal and 
macroeconomic environment of the FDI destination (Bevan et al., 2004; Rugman and Verbeke, 
2001), especially in China (Dees, 1998). Dunning (2006) and Dunning‘s (1993) OLI framework 
state that market size and openness of the host country are important FDI motivations. We 
measure absolute and relative incom of the Chinese economy by GDP and GDP per capita, 
respectively, during the 1998-2007 period. Openness is measured by the ratio of exports plus 
imports to GDP in China. 
Hypothesis 14, 15. The higher GDP, GDPPC growth in China, the more EU FDI flows in China 
1.2.4 Location-institutional advantage 
Three variables were used to measure Location-institutional advantages:  
Exchange rate 
The exchange rate has a most important link with economic policy and international 
competitiveness, yet the effect of the exchange rate on FDI is one of the most controversial among 
the less conventional factors of FDI. De Mello (1997) and Pain and Welsum (2003) argued that 
host currency appreciation may well stimulate inward investment that wishes to sell within host 
markets. Cushman (1984) suggested that host currency depreciation can make purchasing 
intermediate goods from a home country more expensive and subsequently reduce import-needed 
FDI. 
Froot and Stein‘s (1991) imperfect capital market argument suggests that real exchange rate and 
FDI inflows are positively correlated. Trevino and Grosse (2002) posit the same expectation. 
However, the capital gain hypothesis suggests an inverse link (see e.g., De Santis et al., 2004). In 
our case, a real depreciation of Euro increases the prices of foreign products for EU firms and 
boosts the confidence of Chinese competitors, which can lead to an increase in FDI in China 
H16a/b: The positive association of depreciating host currency (appreciating home currency) is 
stronger on EU FDI to China 
Corruption, Rule Law  
Furthermore, we introduce two different institutional factors, i.e., ‗corruption‘ and ‗rule of law.‘ 
These variables can be proxies for the quality of legal environment in China and we expect that 
lower corruption levels and higher rule of law values should attract more FDI from EU (see e.g., 
Forssbaeck and Oxelheim, 2008; Stoian and Filippaios, 2008). Corruption index data ranging 
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from zero to six is from PRS group, a consultant company specializing in producing macro 
economic and political related data. A higher score represents lower corruption. Data for ‗rule of 
law‘ is from World Governance Indicators by World Bank Institute. It captures perceptions of the 
extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and in particular the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the 
likelihood of crime and violence. The scores range between -2 and 2, with higher values 
indicating a better law system. 
H17, 18: The higher quality Rule law and lower Corruption in China, the more EU FDI flows into 
China).  
Finally, Our hypotheses, their theoretical justification, the proxies/definition we use and the 
expected signs are detailed in Table 1; based on the literature review, we classified ownership 
advantage and internalization advantage factors in panel A: Company–specific factors,  and 
location-economic and location- institutional factors in Panel B: Country-specific factors. We 
expect the distinctive nature of the factors influencing EU FDI in China to be captured by the 
collective significance in the variables that we identify in the table 1. 
Table 1 
 Descriptive statistics and variable definitions. 
Variable name 
Definition 
  
Mean 
Media
n 
Std 
dev. Min. Max. 
Theoretic
al 
Justificati
on (expected sign) 
Panel A. Company- specific factors:ownership advantage and internalization advantage factors 
FDI 1 (Dep. 
Var) 
Natural logarithm of foreign 
capital 
 
10.22
5 
10.81
7 3.027 0 15.71 
FDI 2 (Dep. 
Var) 
Foreign capital over total 
capital 
 
0.759 0.891 0.289 0 1 
Capital 
intensity (+) 
fixed assets to  number of 
employees 
Ownershi
p 
10.59
7 
10.75
7 2.02 0 17.2 
Firm size (+) 
Natural logarithm of total 
assets  
Ownershi
p 
12.07
2 
12.06
1 1.618 0 
17.42
5 
R&D (+) 
Intangible assets to total 
assets 
Internaliz
ation 0.031 0.004 0.055 
-
0.013 0.604 
Firm age (+) 
Natural logarithm of years 
since establishment in China 
Ownershi
p 2.571 2.639 0.439 0.693 4.511 
Export 
intensity2 (+) Export sales over total sales 
Ownershi
p 0.167 0.001 0.275 0 1 
Profitability 
(+) 
Operating profits over total 
assets   
Ownershi
p 0.064 0.049 0.179 
-
1.613 1.479 
Wage  (+) 
 Natural logarithm of real 
wages 
Ownershi
p 8.809 8.817 1.555 0 
14.39
3 
Personal share 
(-) 
Personal capital over total 
capital 
Internaliz
ation 0.006 0 0.055 0 1 
Advertising (+) 
advertising expenditures to 
sales 
Internaliz
ation 1.228 0 2.656 0 14.13 
Technology (+) 
Natural logarithm of 
intangible assets 
Internaliz
ation 4.877 6.485 4.498 0 14.53 
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Innovation (+) 
Natural logarithm of output 
involving new product 
innovation   
Internaliz
ation 1.855 0 4.379 0 
18.38
4 
Leverage (-) 
Total liabilities over total 
assets 
Internaliz
ation 0.512 0.503 0.261 0 1 
 Panel B. Country- specific factors: location-economic and location- institutional factors  
GDP (+) 
Natural logarithm of  gross 
domestic product of China  
Location-
econimic 
factor 
28.25
1 
28.28
9 0.369 
27.65
1 
28.84
9 
Openness (+) 
Exports plus imports over 
GDP in China 
Location-
econimic 
factor 0.585 0.654 0.127 0.364 0.72 
GDPPC (+) GDP per capita in China 
Location-
econimic 
factor 7.271 7.304 0.353 6.706 7.848 
Exchange rate 
(-/+) 
Exchange rate between Euro 
and Chinese Yuan 
location-
institution
al factor 9.624 9.722 1.216 7.37 11.25 
Corruption (-) Corruption index for China 
location-
institution
al factor 1.655 2 0.441 1 2 
Rule of law (+) Rule of law in China 
location-
institution
al factor -0.409 -0.411 0.046 
-
0.484 
-
0.358 
 
 
 
3. DATA AND METHODS 
3.1 FDI by EU firms in China 
 
Since the People‘s Republic of China was established in 1949, European investment in China has 
undergone dramatic change. Five phases may be identified in the development of EU FDI in 
China: nationalisation (1949-1957), exclusion (1958-1979), resumption (1980-1992), rapid 
increase (1993-1999) and further development in the new Millennium (2000- ).European 
investment was the dominant position in 1949; statistics show European enterprises‘ control of the 
principal mines and heavy industries with an investment of US$1734.1 million in 1936, which 
accounted for about half of total foreign investment in China. However, they totally disappeared 
in 1950s because the Chinese government redefined and eliminated foreign investment in China 
over the period from 1949-1957. China embarked on ‗opening-up‘ and economic reform policy15 
and signed a trade agreement with the EEC in 1978 after a 20 - years ‗quiet‘ period in terms of 
foreign investment. EU investment resumed
16
 and in the early 1990s it rapidly increased.  FDI 
                                                 
15
 The decision was made during the Third Plenary Session of the 11
th
 central Committee of Communist Parety of 
China in 1978. See Wang YongJun, Investment in China: A question and answer guide on how to do business. 
16
 The June 4th events in 1898, however, caused the EU freeze its relations with China. Nevertheless, relations were 
soon restored and China was reinstated on the list of countries eligible for co-operation commencing in 1992. 
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trends were character by trends with these aspects regarding the policy: entry modes
17
, ideological 
breakthroughs, governing laws, and Special Economic Zones (SEZs)
18
 with ‗special policies‘ and 
‗flexible measures‘19. Further development has taken place in the new Millennium against the 
background of two of the biggest, mutual markets, bilateral political relations and China‘s 
accession to the WTO (Qiu, 1999; Bulcke, 2003; Shan, 2005; European Commission, 2007). The 
rapid evolution of European Union‘ foreign direct investment relationship with China has taken 
the world by surprise, Detail discussed in Section 1  
As regards the characteristic of EU firm in Chinese manufacturing sector in our research period 
1998-2007, the firms are Middle - Large Sizes. Especially after WTO, a growing number of 
leading EU MNCs have engaged in large-scale FDI in projects in China, considering the 
investment climate as stable and with no risk. The equity share held by the EU firms in China 
reached on average 60.9 per cent, a reflection of the dominant position in the ownership of their 
operations in China. SOEs accounted for 14.91 per cent of capital share in 1978, but only 9.2 per 
cent in 2007. Interestingly, private share accounted for only 0.67 per cent in 1985, but increased to 
2.16 per cent in 1998. The contribution of domestic private enterprises to EU FDI inflow has 
increased significantly because of the reform and privatization of SOEs in China on one hand, and 
the EU firms‘ operations and strategies on the other hand (Peng et al. 2004, Bulcke, 2003).  
 
Regarding the mode of EU firm in China, the duration of equity Joint Venture JVs (EJV), 
contractual Joint Venture (CJV) and Wholly Foreign Enterprises (WFOE) of European-invested 
enterprises rose significantly since the beginning of the 1990s. Majority and wholly owned firms 
were chosen more frequently. The number of EU WFOE rose from 28 in1998 up to 183 in 2007 
as a result of the introduction of the liberal Chinese ownership policy and the consequent changes 
in the strategic options of EU firm‘s Chinese operations.  
The sector distribution of EU firms in China has changed somewhat over the period 1998-2007. 
Post –WTO (2002-2007) R&D based industries was more important compared to pre-2001(1998-
2001).  As already mentioned, this probably reflected the positive perception of the political 
situation of foreign investors in high-tech and long-term oriented projects at that time.  The larger 
EU presence is in combination of high-technology and labour intensive sectors  such as raw 
chemical materials & chemical products, Transport equipment, Electronic & telecommunications 
and other electronic equipment.  
3.2 Data  
We use a new and comprehensive firm-level data set on the foreign activities of EU 
manufacturing firms draw on two data sources: EU Firm FDI name list from Thomson one bank 
and details of each principal variable from the Annual Reports of Industrial Enterprises Statistics 
compiled by the National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS). The Annual report covers the 
population of firms (both foreign and local) with annual turnover of over five million Renminbi 
(just above$600,000) inside China. It is estimated that the firms contained in the dataset account 
for about 85–90% of total output in most industries. The dataset includes information on firm 
ownership structure, industry affiliation, geographic location, establishment year, employment, 
gross output, sales, R&D, value added, net fixed assets, exports, R&D, and employee training 
                                                 
17
 China promulgated the Chinese-Foreign Equity joint Venture Law (EJVL) in 1979, WFOEs in 1986 and CJVs in 
1988. 
18
 The first four SEZs were Zhenzhen, Zhuhai, and Shantou in Guangdong Province and Xiamen in Fujian Province. 
In the 1990s, Hainan Province as a whole and Pudong New District in Shanghai were granted the same status, as were 
21 cities along the Yangtze River and in the Northeast. 
19
 The ‗special policies‘ and ‗flexible measures‘ can be interpreted as  special privileges and treatment for foreigners 
investing in these zones,  where they could carry out investment and trading activities that were not allowed in th e 
rest of the country , or were allowed but with less favourable conditions.   
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expenditures. For the NBS the original dataset covers an unbalanced panel spanning the period 
1998-2007. However, in view of the objective of this paper and we restrict our attention to the EU 
firms.  In China, all the firms, local foreign, are required by law to complete the census survey 
conducted by NBS. It includes data for 33 two-digit manufacturing industries and over 400 four-
digit industries. 
The data set is suitable for studying the EU Firms FDI in China for the following reasons. First, 
Pan, Li, & Tse (1999) have reported that census data are reliable and internally consistent for 
empirical studies. Studies using the data have been published in leading journals (Tan & Peng, 
2003; Wei & Liu, 2006; Girma and Gong, 2008). Second, the NBS pays special attention to 
ensuring the quality of the data. Several logic tests are performed to ensure the accuracy of the 
information in the report, identify and eliminate illogical data points and ensuring the consistency 
of the reported figures. A notable feature of this data is that information disclosure by firms is 
compulsory, leading to a 100% response rate. While inaccurate data disclosure has been a feature 
of many transition economies, Chinese networks and the two–way interdependence of firms and 
the State make major inaccuracies less likely. Third, this dataset has at least two advantages: it 
covers a very recent period, and it allows us to control for observable and unobservable firm-level 
characteristics in order to mitigate aggregation bias. The multi-year census data enable us to 
employ a panel data structure to test our models. Thus we can investigate firms‘ foreign 
investment activities over time, and test the dynamic causal relationship, which is the main 
advantage over static cross-sectional data (Fitzmaurice, Laird, & Ware, 2004; Dunning 2009;  
Gao et al., 2010). 
Another feature of the database is that EU firms are classified under five ownership (status) 
categories: state-owned, collective-owned, corporate-owned, and personal-owned and HKMT-
owned, while a continuous measure of other ownership composition is constructed from the data 
base by looking at the fraction of paid in capital by other investors. This is the key variable as far 
as this paper is concerned since it identifies the level of treatment received by EU firm in China. 
This feature remains a unique enterprise identifier irrespective of dynamics of ownership change. 
In our study, we focus on private-owned share variables; one is based on no previous empirical 
study, the other is the variable is largest (dynamic) change among ownership structure under the 
more liberal Chinese FDI policy with respect to ownership. Accordingly, we identified less than 
0.9% personal share capital at the start of the sample (i.e., 1998), and by the end of the sample 
period (2007), more than 18% of these were still under majority EU ownership capital. The 
dataset has the necessary time series information for dynamic panel data GMM estimations to 
determine EU firm FDI model. 
As a result, our final dataset consist of an unbalanced panel of 2,932 observations from about 680 
EU firms over the period 1998-2007 in China after standard data filtering.  We follow criteria 
from the first Economic Census in classifying the EU firms 30 sectors in large & middle 
mafumafacturing industry and 9 industries according to SIC classes. 
3.3 Descriptive statistics 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the firm-specific (ownership and Internalization 
factors) and country-specific (Location-economic and Location-institution) factors. It further 
shows variables‘ definitions and their expected relation with FDI. With respect to the mean values 
of some of the explanatory variables, firm profitability is about 6.5%, which is not particularly 
high and it may imply that EU firms‘ low profitability could be a driving motive to invest in 
China. The leverage ratio is around 51% and can be considered as relatively high. Furthermore, 
ownership of less than 1% at personal level seems to be low. The average age of EU firms is 
about 14 years, which may imply that relatively younger firms would seek opportunities in China 
to grow. Regarding the export intensity, about 17% of EU firms‘ sales are in the form of exports. 
The R&D intensity, on the other hand, is just over 3%. 
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3.4 Correlation matrix 
 
Table 2 presents the correlation matrix between the variables. Our dependent variable is the FDI 
in China made by EU MNEs, which is continuous. We measure EU FDI in China in two ways; i) 
the natural logarithm of foreign capital, ii) the ratio of foreign capital to total capital. All the non-
ratio variables in this study are inflation-adjusted. In what follows, we discuss the potential FDI 
determinants at firm and country level. 
The signs of the coefficients based on the link between FDI 1 and firm-specific factors are 
generally consistent with predictions, except on Profitability. Regarding the country-specific 
factors, Exchange rate, Rule of law and Corruption produce signs that contrast with the 
expectations. When examining the coefficient signs based on FDI 2, there are more factors with 
unexpected signs. Although these preliminary findings based on a univariate analysis give us 
some insights, one needs to be cautious of the limitations of such an analysis.   
 
Table 2   
 Correlation matrix. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1. FDI 1 1.00 
         
2. FDI 2 0.59
** 
         
3. Capital 
intensity 
0.46
**
 -0.02 
        
4. Firm size 0.44
**
 -0.06
**
 0.84
**
 
       
5. R&D 0.05
**
 -0.02 0.04
*
 -0.04
*
 
      
6. Firm age 0.07
**
 -0.09
**
 0.09
**
 0.17
**
 -0.10
**
 
     
7. Export 
intensity1 
-0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.04
*
 -0.02 -0.04
*
 
    
8. Profitability -0.10
**
 -0.03 -0.09
**
 0.02 -0.16
**
 0.05
*
 -0.01 
   
9. Labour cost 0.35
**
 -0.05
**
 0.66
**
 0.79
**
 -0.10
**
 0.26
**
 -0.04 0.06
**
 
  
10. Personal 
share 
-0.11
**
 -0.13
**
 -0.04
*
 -0.05
*
 0.05
**
 -0.11
**
 -0.01 0.01 -0.05
**
 
 
11. 
Advertising 
0.05
**
 0.00 0.16
**
 0.21
**
 0.03 0.07
**
 0.00 0.01 0.29
**
 -0.03 
12. 
Technology 
0.16
**
 -0.08
**
 0.34
**
 0.27
**
 0.58
**
 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11
**
 0.18
**
 0.01 
13. Innovation 0.11
**
 -0.17
**
 0.17
**
 0.25
**
 -0.02 0.11
**
 
-
0.05
*
 
0.02 0.25
**
 0.02 
14. Export 
intensity2 
0.13
**
 0.20
**
 0.12
**
 0.08
**
 -0.07
**
 -0.04
*
 0.01 0.02 0.11
**
 0.02 
15. Leverage 0.01 0.05
*
 0.11
**
 0.19
**
 -0.04
*
 -0.06
**
 0.02 -0.36
**
 0.16
**
 
-
0.04
*
 
16. Openness -0.03 0.07 0.04
*
 0.09
**
 -0.13
**
 -0.17
**
 0.03 0.11
**
 0.17
**
 0.04
*
 
17. GDP 0.03 0.11
**
 0.06
**
 0.11
**
 -0.17
**
 -0.14
**
 0.02 0.11
**
 0.19
**
 0.03 
18. GDPPC 0.03 0.11
**
 0.06
**
 0.11
**
 -0.17
**
 -0.14
**
 0.02 0.11
**
 0.19
**
 0.03 
19. Exchange 
rate 
-0.11
**
 -0.03 0.03 0.07
**
 -0.17
**
 -0.11
**
 0.02 0.07
**
 0.14
**
 0.03 
20. Corruption -0.08
**
 -0.05
**
 0.02 0.01 0.12
**
 -0.11
**
 0.03 -0.04
*
 0.03 0.03 
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21. Rule of 
law 
-0.13
**
 -0.14
**
 -0.06
**
 -0.07
**
 0.15
**
 0.08
**
 -0.01 -0.06
**
 -0.12
**
 -0.03 
           
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
12. 
Technology 
0.08
**
 
         
13. Innovation 0.05
**
 0.06
**
 
        
14. Export 
intensity2 
-0.07
**
 -0.04
*
 0.03 
       
15. Leverage 0.06
**
 0.02 0.03 0.03 
      
16. Openness 0.39
**
 -0.15
**
 -0.06
**
 0.03 0.02 
     
17. GDP 0.37
**
 -0.24
**
 -0.03 0.07
**
 0.02 0.84
**
 
    
18. GDPPC 0.37
**
 -0.24
**
 -0.03 0.07
**
 0.02 0.84
**
 
0.99
*
*
    
19. Exchange 
rate 
0.30
**
 -0.25
**
 -0.09
**
 -0.07
**
 0.03 0.74
**
 
0.67
*
*
 
0.67
**
 
  
20. Corruption 0.23
**
 0.27
**
 -0.06
**
 -0.04
*
 0.04
*
 0.31
**
 
0.17
*
*
 
0.17
**
 0.26
**
 
 
21. Rule of 
law 
-0.17
**
 0.22
**
 -0.05
*
 -0.14
**
 -0.01 -0.64
**
 
-
0.6
**
 
-0.66
**
 -0.37
**
 
-
0.2
**
 
* (**) indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05(0.01) level (two-tailed, Pearson). 
 
3.5 Static analysis of FDI determinants 
Our discussion suggests the following log-linear model (1); the data are transformed into natural 
logarithms as we expect non-linearities in the relationships on the basis of theory and previous 
empirical work. The determinants of EU FDI in China are examined using the model below, and 
the following multiple regression equation is employed as the base specification for the empirical 
test to identify the major determinants of China‘s FDI inflows from EU firms  
                          
 
   
 
                                                                          (1) 
where FSF and CSF are firm-specific and country-specific factors, respectively, as shown in 
Table 3; α (the intercept term), β and γ are estimable coefficients; ε is the error term; i and t stand 
for firm and time, respectively. FDI is either FDI 1 or FDI 2. 
Equation (1) is used as a regression model for the pooled OLS, random effects (RE) and fixed 
effects (FE) estimation methods. We report both RE and FE outputs for comparative purposes 
even if the Hausman test favours the latter. 
Table 2 
 Correlation matrix. 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
1. FDI 1 1.00 
         
2. FDI 2 0.59
** 
         
3. Capital 
intensity 
0.46
**
 -0.02 
        
4. Firm size 0.44
**
 -0.06
**
 0.84
**
 
       
5. R&D 0.05
**
 -0.02 0.04
*
 -0.04
*
 
      
6. Firm age 0.07
**
 -0.09
**
 0.09
**
 0.17
**
 -0.10
**
 
     
7. Export 
intensity1 
-0.04 0.03 -0.03 -0.04
*
 -0.02 -0.04
*
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8. Profitability -0.10
**
 -0.03 -0.09
**
 0.02 -0.16
**
 0.05
*
 -0.01 
   
9. Labour cost 0.35
**
 -0.05
**
 0.66
**
 0.79
**
 -0.10
**
 0.26
**
 -0.04 0.06
**
 
  
10. Personal 
share 
-0.11
**
 -0.13
**
 -0.04
*
 -0.05
*
 0.05
**
 -0.11
**
 -0.01 0.01 -0.05
**
 
 
11. Advertising 0.05
**
 0.00 0.16
**
 0.21
**
 0.03 0.07
**
 0.00 0.01 0.29
**
 -0.03 
12. Technology 0.16
**
 -0.08
**
 0.34
**
 0.27
**
 0.58
**
 -0.01 -0.03 -0.11
**
 0.18
**
 0.01 
13. Innovation 0.11
**
 -0.17
**
 0.17
**
 0.25
**
 -0.02 0.11
**
 
-
0.05
*
 
0.02 0.25
**
 0.02 
14. Export 
intensity2 
0.13
**
 0.20
**
 0.12
**
 0.08
**
 -0.07
**
 -0.04
*
 0.01 0.02 0.11
**
 0.02 
15. Leverage 0.01 0.05
*
 0.11
**
 0.19
**
 -0.04
*
 -0.06
**
 0.02 -0.36
**
 0.16
**
 
-
0.04
*
 
16. Openness -0.03 0.07 0.04
*
 0.09
**
 -0.13
**
 -0.17
**
 0.03 0.11
**
 0.17
**
 0.04
*
 
17. GDP 0.03 0.11
**
 0.06
**
 0.11
**
 -0.17
**
 -0.14
**
 0.02 0.11
**
 0.19
**
 0.03 
18. GDPPC 0.03 0.11
**
 0.06
**
 0.11
**
 -0.17
**
 -0.14
**
 0.02 0.11
**
 0.19
**
 0.03 
19. Exchange 
rate 
-0.11
**
 -0.03 0.03 0.07
**
 -0.17
**
 -0.11
**
 0.02 0.07
**
 0.14
**
 0.03 
20. Corruption -0.08
**
 -0.05
**
 0.02 0.01 0.12
**
 -0.11
**
 0.03 -0.04
*
 0.03 0.03 
21. Rule of law -0.13
**
 -0.14
**
 -0.06
**
 -0.07
**
 0.15
**
 0.08
**
 -0.01 -0.06
**
 -0.12
**
 -0.03 
           
 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) 
12. Technology 0.08
**
 
         
13. Innovation 0.05
**
 0.06
**
 
        
14. Export 
intensity2 
-0.07
**
 -0.04
*
 0.03 
       
15. Leverage 0.06
**
 0.02 0.03 0.03 
      
16. Openness 0.39
**
 -0.15
**
 -0.06
**
 0.03 0.02 
     
17. GDP 0.37
**
 -0.24
**
 -0.03 0.07
**
 0.02 0.84
**
 
    
18. GDPPC 0.37
**
 -0.24
**
 -0.03 0.07
**
 0.02 0.84
**
 
0.99
*
*
    
19. Exchange 
rate 
0.30
**
 -0.25
**
 -0.09
**
 -0.07
**
 0.03 0.74
**
 
0.67
*
*
 
0.67
**
 
  
20. Corruption 0.23
**
 0.27
**
 -0.06
**
 -0.04
*
 0.04
*
 0.31
**
 
0.17
*
*
 
0.17
**
 0.26
**
 
 
21. Rule of law -0.17
**
 0.22
**
 -0.05
*
 -0.14
**
 -0.01 -0.64
**
 
-
0.6
**
 
-0.66
**
 -0.37
**
 
-
0.2
**
 
* (**) indicates correlation is significant at the 0.05(0.01) level (two-tailed, Pearson). 
3.6 Dynamic analysis of FDI determinants 
 
According to the literature review and its department, discussed in Section 2, FDI has a dynamic 
nature. In order to understand this we decided to apply an econometric dynamic panel data and we 
compared the results with a static panel. The results of the dynamic panel are confirmed in general 
by the results of static analysis. Luo et al. (2008) argue that the FDI process is dynamic and 
continuous. We also consider the possibility that EU firms would not find it feasible to maximise 
their direct investment in China. It may be that they would attempt to optimise the level of FDI by 
looking at the benefits and costs of incremental increase in FDI. With a similar reasoning, 
Oxelheim and Ghauri (2008) discuss the costs and benefits of attracting FDI. 
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Assume that a firm (i) has a target FDI level at time (t), denoted as FDI
*
it, which is 
determined by a set of firm- and country-specific variables (Xs): 
     
              
 
                                                                                                           (2) 
where x is a vector of k explanatory variables; νit is a serially correlated disturbance term with 
mean zero and possibly heteroscedastic; and μ‘s are unknown estimable parameters. 
The model assumes that EU firms adjust their current FDI level (FDIit) according to the degree of 
adjustment coefficient ‗ρ‘, to achieve their target FDI intensity: 
                                                            ρ       
                                                           (3) 
The actual change in FDI will be equal to the target change when ρ is one. If, however, ρ 
is zero, EU firms would adopt no changes in their FDI policy, suggesting that either the lagged 
level is the target FDI level, or the adjustment cost is higher than the cost of remaining off- target. 
We can obtain equation (4) by substituting (2) into (3): 
              ρ           ρ           
 
   ρ  ν                                                      (4)    
The equation (4) assumes that ρ takes values within the [0, 1] range. If the cost of being off-target 
is higher (lower) than the cost of changing FDI policies, then ρ converges to one (zero).20 The 
random disturbance term νit includes both time-invariant and firm-invariant effects. 
Dees (1998), De Santis et al. (2004) and Hsiao and Hsiao (2004) also consider the error 
correction mechanism and use the lagged dependent variable (FDIt-1) as an explanatory variable. 
The inclusion of FDIt-1 in (4) as a regression model would produce biased results when OLS, RE 
or FE estimations are used. In order to avoid any potential bias, the FDI literature (e.g., Cheng and 
Kwan, 2000) propose the use of GMM technique for a dynamic model such as (4).
21
 Being 
consistent with the agglomeration effect, the inclusion of FDIt-1 can represent a positive feedback 
effect, suggesting that higher existing FDI can attract further future FDI (Buch et al., 2005; Head 
and Ries, 1996; Luo et al., 2008).  
4  FINDING AND DISCUSSION 
 
This section reports both static and dynamic analysis regression results. We considered the 
possibility of the non-monotonous association of FDI with the factors age, R&D and size (see e.g., 
Pradhan, 2004): The results do not confirm any obvious non-linear link for age but for R&D and 
size. Therefore, we report the results below assuming a non-linear association of FDI with R&D 
and size. Furthermore, our initial findings reveal that time and industry dummies are not 
statistically significant. This may be expected because all the firms in our sample are from the 
manufacturing sector, and some country-specific factors already account for time effects. Hence, 
                                                 
20
 This section is based on the partial adjustment mechanism (Blinder, 1986), and error correction mechanism 
discussing long-term relationship between two factors and short-term deviation from equilibrium (Engle and Granger, 
1987; Johansen, 1988). As discussed in Blundell and Bond (1998), and Dees (1998), the long-term relation between 
the dependent variable and its determinants may differ from the short-term effects.  
 
21
 Under the two-step system-GMM, the model is estimated in both levels and first differences; i.e., in stacked 
regressions level equations are simultaneously estimated using differenced lagged regressors as instruments. The 
GMM technique controls for the endogeneity problem that arises because of random shocks affecting simultaneously 
both FDI level and its determinants. Trevino and Daniels (1994) raise this endogeneity issue with the example of 
whether firms have FDI because they are profitable or vice-versa. Similarly, Dunning and Narula (1995) state that   
international R&D investment may lag rather than lead investment in international production facilities, with the latter 
being a determinant of the former. GMM also addresses the issue of unobservable firm heterogeneity. See Blundell 
and Bond (1998), and Zwinkels and Beugelsdijk (2010), among others, for further details about the comparison of 
various estimation methods. 
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we do not include in our models these dummy variables, noting that inclusion of these dummies 
does not change the quality of results. 
4.1 Static analysis 
Table 3 reports the regression results for the static model using OLS, FE and RE methods.
22
 It 
seems the EU firms with higher capital intensity tend to invest more in China as the respective 
coefficient is positive across all methods and significant for OLS and RE methods. This finding 
confirms hypothesis 1 and is in line with the observation that the investment experience of EU 
firms is characterized as capital intensive industries (e.g., machinery and transport equipment) 
rather than high labour input such as textiles and furniture. This finding is consistent with 
Dunning (2000), and Roberts and Tybout (1997), among others. 
 Blomstrom and Lipsey (1989), and Buckley and Casson (1976) argue that a firm‘s size reflects 
its capability to engage in these types of activities. The results in Table 3 reveal a reverse-U shape 
between FDI and size, suggesting that size and FDI are positively linked for smaller firms but the 
relation becomes inverse for larger companies. This finding is comparable to Pradhan (2004) for 
Indian manufacturing firms. We report the same type of a non-linear correlation between FDI and 
R&D, which implies that higher R&D intensity improves FDI in China but after some point R&D 
and FDI move in opposite directions. These findings do not confirm hypotheses 2 and 3 in the 
sense that they assume linearity. 
 Our findings also suggest that EU firms with higher export intensity tend to engage more in 
Chinese FDI, confirming hypothesis 3. Rather surprisingly, we find that firm profitability and FDI 
are significantly and inversely related. MNEs are usually in a better financial position to raise 
capital. High profitability will increase the probability of expanding abroad, as confirmed by 
Trevino and Daniels (1994) for U.S. FDI. There can be a few reasons why EU FDI in China may 
not behave in the conventional manner. First, the theories about the determinants of FDI are 
derived from Dunning‘s OLI paradigm. This approach offers a valuable framework to determine, 
on one hand, what a firm‘s ownership advantages are, and on the other, how these advantages can 
be enhanced by using specific location sites. It may also be that because the EU MNEs invested in 
China with a market–seeking motive, they were especially concerned with access to the domestic 
market (distribution network and market information and the relationship with host government), 
rather than profit-seeking. Moreover, the significantly positive coefficient on labour cost is 
consistent with hypothesis 6, implying that higher employee costs lead to more FDI in China. 
Confirming Luo et al. (2009), we find that age and FDI are linearly but inversely linked. Hence, 
this is inconsistent with hypothesis 4. The coefficient estimate on ownership structure is strongly 
negative. This means that the less the share ownership at personal level, the greater EU FDI in 
China, which supports hypothesis 9. Regarding the technology factor, the significantly negative 
coefficient contradicts hypothesis 8 as it suggests that higher technological intensity actually 
lowers FDI. Trevino and Daniels (1994) also fail to detect a positive and significant association. It 
maybe that high-technology EU firms have firm-specific advantages that cannot easily be 
emulated, hence they would prefer to export rather than internalise production via FDI because of 
their quasi-monopolistic power (Giddy, 1978). 
The significantly negative coefficient on leverage reveals that higher debt usage in EU 
firms‘ capital structure reduces their FDI activity in China, which is consistent with hypothesis 12, 
and Luo et al. (2009). Finally, the estimated coefficients related to advertising intensity and 
product innovation imply that these factors do not affect significantly EU firms‘ decisions to 
invest in China.  
                                                 
22
 The censored Tobit regressions were conducted as our dependent variable is limited not to take negative values. 
The Tobit results (not reported) are very similar to the OLS estimates. 
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 We next discuss the implications of the macroeconomic or institutional factors. The 
significantly negative coefficient on exchange rate implies that the depreciation of Chinese Yuan 
against Euro reduces EU FDI into China, which supports the capital gain hypothesis.
23
 As 
expected, the positive coefficient on GDP implies that higher market size is directly linked to FDI, 
which confirms Forssbaeck and Oxelheim (2008), among others. It seems the level of corruption 
does not affect EU firms‘ FDI decisions. Surprisingly, improvements in rule of law and trade 
openness seem to deter FDI made by EU firms. The negativity of rule of law may stem from the 
notion that EU MNEs in Chinese manufacturing industry are principally based on a market–
seeking motive despite relatively low profitability and despite the substantial market access 
barriers for trade and investment in China.
24
  
 
                                                 
23
 The results are robust to the multicollinearity problem as the variance inflation factors (VIFs) are between the range 
of 1.02 and 8.87. Furthermore, replacing GDP by GDPPC or using alternative export intensity measures produces 
qualitatively the same results. As being another robustness check, we dropped openness and kept GDP in the model 
(and vice-versa) because of high correlation coefficient between them. Again, the results remain largely the same with 
when both variables are included in the same model. 
 
24
 Since WTO accession in December 2001, China has made progress in liberalising sectors by formally adapting its 
laws and lowering tariffs in line with its accession commitments. However, implementation at the provincial level has 
not always followed the spirit of China‘s WTO commitments (European Commission, 2007:4, ‗Study on the future 
opportunities and challenges in EU-China trade and investment relations 2006-2010‘). 
 
Table 3 
 Firm-specific and country-specific factors influencing foreign direct investment decisions 
(1998-2007). 
 
 
Pooled OLS Random effects Fixed effects 
Company-specific factors:( ownership 
advantage and internalization advantage 
factors) 
  
Capital intensity 0.259 (0.062)*** 0.225 (0.083)*** 0.082 (0.136) 
Firm size 0.783 (0.093)*** 0.724 (0.106)*** 1.154 (0.308)*** 
Firm size
 2 
-0.012 (0.004)*** -0.009 (0.004)** -0.045 (0.019)** 
R&D 6.290 (2.512)*** 6.044 (2.774)** 4.378 (2.186)** 
R&D
2 
-13.629 (6.803)** -12.317 (5.688)** -7.125 (2.933)** 
Firm age -0.175 (0.102)* -0.199 (0.108)* -2.230 (1.127)** 
Export intensity2 0.466 (0.129)*** 0.501 (0.173)*** 0.482 (0.240)** 
Profitability -2.117 (0.316)*** -1.938 (0.350)*** -1.117 (0.428)*** 
Labour cost 0.092 (0.055)* 0.114 (0.067)* 0.128 (0.075)* 
Personal share -5.443 (1.581)*** -5.707 (1.775)*** -7.473 (2.251)*** 
Advertising 0.009 (0.024) 0.016 (0.028) 0.029 (0.038) 
Technology -0.002 (0.020) -0.013 (0.021) -0.038 (0.018)** 
Innovation -0.012 (0.011) -0.003 (0.016) 0.033 (0.024) 
Leverage -1.340 (0.218)*** -1.348 (0.266)*** -0.905 (0.440)** 
 
Country-specific factors:( location-economic 
and location- institutional factors) 
  
Openness -11.717 (1.759)*** -11.499 (1.626)*** -10.379 (1.793)*** 
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4.2. The effect of WTO accession 
Since WTO accession in December 2001, China has made progress in liberalising sectors by 
formally adapting its laws and lowering tariffs in line with its accession commitments. However, 
implementation at the provincial level has not always followed the spirit of China‘s WTO 
commitments. Stated industrial policies and the use of non-tariff barriers (NTB‘s) have shaped 
the evolution of nearly all of the Chinese sectors reviewed, particularly those deemed ‗strategic‘ 
sectors. Many of these policies result in unequal treatment of European operators in sectors 
ranging from machinery and automotive to services like construction, finance, and telecoms.  
As the coefficients on the WTO dummy variable representing 2002-2007 period in Table 3 is 
positive and very significant, this may suggest that China‘s WTO accession has increased EU FDI 
in China. Oxelheim and Ghauri (2008) also discuss the relevance of WTO. Therefore, we next 
split the sample into 1998-2001 and 2002-2007 time periods in Table 4.  
The firm-specific variables capital intensity, size, profitability, personal share, advertising, 
technology, innovation and leverage generally produce results similar to Table 3 and similar 
across two periods. However, the factors R&D, age, export intensity and labour cost seem to be 
sensitive to the time period. The non-linear relation between R&D and FDI in Table 3 is obtained 
only for the post-WTO period. The inverse relation between age and FDI for the full sample 
seems to be driven by the pre-WTO period, and this negative link gets insignificant for the later 
period. Export intensity seems to positively influence FDI only during the post-WTO period. In 
addition, the relevance of labour costs is reported only for the pre-WTO period, where higher 
costs lead to higher FDI. Finally, except GDP, all the country-specific factors are only significant 
for the post-WTO period, where openness (corruption) has a significant and positive (negative) 
coefficient. The positive impact of openness may be because of the Chinese government that 
relaxed foreign trade policy for the manufacturing industry after WTO membership. Exchange 
rate and rule of law coefficients for this period are consistent with the full sample results. 
 
 
 
 
 
GDP 2.421 (0.429)*** 2.281 (0.383)*** 2.980 (0.557)*** 
Exchange rate -0.455 (0.074)*** -0.479 (0.068)*** -0.550 (0.071)*** 
Corruption 0.087 (0.148) 0.142 (0.140) 0.215 (0.161) 
Rule of law -14.350 (1.748)*** -14.251 (1.653)*** -14.044 (1.784)*** 
WTO dummy  1.341 (0.244)*** 1.356 (0.197)*** 1.419 (0.210)*** 
    Constant  0.211 (0.843) 0.359 (0.783) 3.047 (1.731)* 
    Firms/observations 680 / 2932 680 / 2932 680 / 2932 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3086 0.4945 0.1535 
F statistic 144.32*** 1016.13*** 7.74*** 
Dependent variable is FDI 1. Firm size
2
 and R&D
2
 are the squared terms of Firm size and 
R&D, respectively. WTO dummy is one for 2002-2007; zero, otherwise. The standard errors 
robust to heteroscedasticity are reported in the parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that the 
coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, 
respectively.  
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Table 4  
Firm-specific and country-specific factors influencing foreign direct investment 
decisions.  
 
 
1998-2001 (pre-WTO) 2002-2007 (post-WTO) 
 
OLS RE FE OLS RE FE 
Company-specific factors: 
   
  
Capital intensity 
0.440 
(0.118)*
** 
0.437 
(0.135)*
** 
-0.006 
(0.413) 
0.187 
(0.070)*
** 
0.154 
(0.075)*
* 
-0.024 
(0.150) 
Firm size 
0.810 
(0.205)*
** 
0.808 
(0.231)*
** 
1.875 
(0.941)*
* 
0.869 
(0.107)*
** 
0.823 
(0.108)*
** 
1.283 
(0.299)*
** 
Firm size
 2 
-0.030 
(0.009)*
** 
-0.029 
(0.009)*
** 
-0.097 
(0.048)*
* 
-0.008 
(0.004)*
* 
-0.008 
(0.004)*
* 
-0.046 
(0.018)*
** 
R&D 
2.966 
(2.852) 
2.979 
(3.465) 
1.044 
(4.840) 
7.660 
(3.416)*
* 
7.330 
(3.292)*
* 
3.387 
(1.690)*
* 
R&D
2 -4.154 
(8.585) 
-4.101 
(10.536) 
0.927 
(10.569) 
-16.308 
(7.924)*
* 
-15.146 
(7.540)*
* 
-8.178 
(4.014)*
* 
Firm age 
-0.553 
(0.276)*
* 
-0.551 
(0.233)*
* 
-2.459 
(1.054)*
* 
-0.107 
(0.129) 
-0.112 
(0.144) 
-1.961 
(1.380) 
Export intensity 
-0.037 
(0.288) 
-0.035 
(0.348) 
-0.024 
(0.473) 
0.407 
(0.136)*
** 
0.336 
(0.159)*
* 
-0.037 
(0.567) 
Profitability 
-2.125 
(0.459)*
** 
-2.090 
(0.496)*
** 
-0.758 
(0.443)* 
-2.093 
(0.379)*
** 
-1.947 
(0.418)*
** 
-0.720 
(0.421)* 
Labour cost 
0.279 
(0.121)*
* 
0.277 
(0.120)*
* 
0.163 
(0.095)* 
-0.030 
(0.070) 
-0.005 
(0.075) 
0.055 
(0.115) 
Personal share 
-14.185 
(2.682)*
** 
-14.198 
(2.922)*
** 
-17.331 
(3.014)*
** 
-3.827 
(1.701)*
* 
-3.934 
(1.873)*
* 
-5.584 
(2.705)*
* 
Advertising 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.013 
(0.024) 
0.010 
(0.027) 
0.011 
(0.039) 
Technology 
0.002 
(0.027) 
0.002 
(0.03) 
-0.054 
(0.060) 
0.020 
(0.028) 
0.017 
(0.027) 
0.005 
(0.028) 
Innovation 
0.005 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.018) 
0.006 
(0.037) 
-0.025 
(0.012)*
* 
-0.016 
(0.019) 
0.044 
(0.032) 
Leverage 
-1.263 
(0.257)*
** 
-1.251 
(0.295)*
** 
0.143 
(1.102) 
-1.363 
(0.271)*
** 
-1.323 
(0.291)*
** 
-0.629 
(0.372)* 
     
  
Country-specific factors: 
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4.3 Dynamic analysis 
As FDI isn‘t static and an add-on dynamic component to the eclectic paradigm, ( Dunning, 2000) 
and an extension of its constituent parts to embrace both asset augmenting and alliance related 
cross-border ventures can do much to uphold its position as the dominant analytical framework 
for examining the determinants of international production We believe that recent economic 
events (China access WTO), and the emergence of new explanations of MNE activity have added 
to, rather than subtracted from, the robustness of the paradigm. While accepting that, in spite of its 
eclecticism (sic), there may be some kinds of foreign owned value added activities which do not 
fit comfortably into its construction, we do believe that it continues to meet most of the criteria of 
a good paradigm; and that it is not yet approaching its own ‗creative destruction‘ (Foss, 1996).34 
Table 5 provides the results for the dynamic model (4) using GMM.  In the ‗general‘ model, we 
include all factors in the regression model. In the ‗specific‘ model, we follow the general-to-
specific approach and drop the insignificant explanatory variables from the ‗general‘ model and 
re-run the regressions (see e.g., Forssbaeck and Oxelheim (2008). The general and specific results 
appear consistent with each other. 
First, we examine whether EU firms optimise their FDI level in China due to various costs and 
benefits by looking at the effect of lagged FDI on current FDI. The coefficient estimate on lagged 
FDI 1 is positive and insignificant but still positive and less than one. On the other hand, when we 
use FDI 2 as an alternative definition, the coefficient turns out to be significant, positive and 
Openness 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
15.051 
(4.457)*
** 
15.065 
(3.806)*
** 
13.553 
(3.896)*
** 
GDP 
-0.152 
(2.827) 
-0.004 
(0.079) 
1.399 
(3.406) 
-0.652 
(0.543) 
-0.702 
(0.450) 
0.311 
(0.646) 
Exchange rate 
0.040 
(0.226) 
0.046 
(0.121) 
-0.095 
(0.213) 
-0.957 
(0.123)*
** 
-0.966 
(0.113)*
** 
-0.995 
(0.121)*
** 
Corruption 
-0.078 
(0.324) 
-0.053 
(0.29) 
0.139 
(0.335) 
-2.715 
(0.568)*
** 
-2.679 
(0.496)*
** 
-2.323 
(0.526)*
** 
Rule of law 
0.001 
(0.001) 
0.183 
(3.327) 
0.001 
(0.001) 
-7.348 
(2.005)*
** 
-7.357 
(1.762)*
** 
-8.084 
(1.924)*
** 
     
  
Constant 
1.643 
(1.010)* 
1.640 
(1.010)* 
2.229 
(2.591) 
6.740 
(1.248)*
** 
6.601 
(1.096)*
** 
9.440 
(2.504)*
** 
     
  
Firms/observati
ons 
309/ 786 309/ 786 309/ 786 
606/ 
2146 
606/ 
2146 
606/2146 
Adjusted R
2
 0.3707 0.5520 0.1757 0.3191 0.4856 0.1917 
F (Wald) 
statistic 
45.80*** 404.1*** 5.70*** 
122.16**
* 
1056.3**
* 
7.50*** 
Dependent variable is FDI 1. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are 
reported in the parentheses. (*), (**) and (***) indicates that the coefficients are 
significant or the relevant null is rejected at the 10, 5 and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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between the [0, 1] range.
25
 Therefore, these findings imply that there is some evidence that EU 
firms tend to adjust their FDI level in China in an attempt to be on the desired level. The 
sensitivity of coefficient estimates on lagged FDI to the FDI definition regarding significant level 
means that firms seem to adjust the relative level of FDI, compared to total capital, rather than the 
absolute FDI. Our finding that past FDI feeds forward subsequent FDI is consistent with Luo et al. 
(2008). As for the country-specific factors, Table 3 and Table 3 produce similar results.  
 Regarding the other results, after controlling for endogeneity and heterogeneity issues, the 
firm-specific factors capital intensity and advertising seem to have no significant effect on FDI 1 
or FDI 2. The GMM results based on the other firm-specific factors size, R&D, age, export 
intensity, profitability, labour cost, personal share, innovation and leverage are generally 
consistent with the results in Table 3. This means, among others, the relation between FDI, and 
R&D and size is non-monotonous. 
The results based on the factors personal share, innovation and leverage seem to be sensitive to 
the FDI definition. For instance, higher product innovativeness is leading to lower FDI in China 
when the FDI measure is FDI 2. Also, personal share and leverage are insignificantly linked to 
FDI 2 whereas this relation is significant and negative in case of FDI 1. 
                                                 
25
 For GMM results to be reliable and consistent, two diagnostics should be fulfilled. First, as expected, the test results 
in Table 5 show the presence of first-order autocorrelation and absence of second-order autocorrelation. Second, 
Sargan p-values confirm the validity of the instrument set. Table 5 reports ‗short-run‘ findings since the 
corresponding models include lagged FDI as an explanatory factor. The short-run association of FDI with its 
determinants can be different from their long-run relationship. The ‗long-run‘ estimations consider this possibility and 
estimates dynamically equation (4). The long-run coefficients on the explanatory variables are obtained by the ratio of 
[μk/ρ]. Moreover, the adjustment time in years can be measured by [1/(μk/ρ)]. See, for instance, Blundell and Bond 
(1998), and Cheng and Kwan (2000) for further details. As lagged FDI‘s coefficients are not large in magnitude, the 
short- and long-run results are qualitatively similar. Hence, we do not report the latter but they are available upon 
request. 
 
Table5 
 Dynamic analysis of FDI determinants using the system-GMM method (1998-2007).    
 
 
FDI 1 
General 
FDI 1 
Specific 
FDI 2 
General 
FDI 2 
Specific 
Company-specific factors: 
   
Lagged FDI 0.003 (0.032) 0.012 (0.025) 0.096 (0.042)** 0.098 (0.035)*** 
Capital intensity 0.226 (0.287) - -0.003 (0.015) - 
Firm size 0.590 (0.340)* 
0.601 
(0.210)*** 
0.145 (0.729)** 0.182 (0.092)** 
Firm size
 2 
-0.016 (0.032) - -0.007 (0.003)** -0.009 (0.005)* 
R&D 
11.939 
(4.389)*** 
13.085 
(4.611)*** 
0.527 (0.263)** 0.190 (0.094)** 
R&D
2 -28.148 
(12.280)** 
-28.984 
(11.81)** 
-1.092 (0.543)** -0.330 (0.193)* 
Firm age -0.537 (0.522) - -0.094 (0.047)** -0.098 (0.047)** 
Export intensity 0.097 (0.411) - 
0.136 
(0.046)*** 
0.162 (0.043)*** 
Profitability 
-3.743 
(1.096)*** 
-3.628 
(0.916)*** 
-0.030 (0.017)* -0.219 (0.095)** 
Labour cost 0.317 (0.152)** 0.305 (0.179)* 0.003 (0.019) - 
Personal share -5.364 (3.158)* -3.588 (2.131)* -0.409 (0.488) - 
DRAFT – Please do not cite or circulate without permission of the author 
 
 
       
5. Conclusions  
We use a sample of 680 firms with 2,932 observations in nine industries during the 1998-
2007 periods to examine the EU firms‘ FDI determinants in China. This study finds that EU FDI 
Advertising -0.111 (0.090) - -0.008 (0.009) - 
Technology 
-0.067 
(0.027)** 
-0.087 
(0.030)*** 
-0.004 (0.002)** -0.004 (0.002)** 
Innovation 0.040 (0.038) - -0.007 (0.003)** -0.006 (0.003)** 
Leverage -0.872 (0.512)* -0.949 (0.558)* 0.144 (0.096) - 
Country-specific factors: 
   
Openness 
-2.440 
(1.211)** 
-3.685 (1.713)** 0.201 (0.160) - 
GDP 
1.122 
(0.398)*** 
0.763 (0.389)** 0.095 (0.039)** 0.113 (0.031)*** 
Exchange rate 
-0.475 
(0.101)*** 
-0.642 
(0.131)*** 
-0.039 
(0.010)*** 
-0.038 (0.010)*** 
Corruption -0.077 (0.184) - -0.034 (0.015)** -0.034 (0.015)** 
Rule of law 
-6.867 
(1.985)*** 
-9.083 
(1.900)*** 
-0.409 (0.176)** -0.503 (0.131)*** 
WTO dummy 
1.048 
(0.304)*** 
1.484 
(0.272)*** 
0.061 
(0.022)*** 
0.071 (0.020)*** 
Constant  
0.448 
(0.118)*** 
0.432 
(0.114)*** 
0.089 
(0.013)*** 
0.083 (0.011)*** 
     
No of 
firms/observations 
490 / 2062 490 / 2062 490 / 2062 490 / 2062 
Adjusted R
2
 0.2319 0.2375 0.2116 0.2124 
Wald Test  124.7*** 255.1*** 149.7*** 165.9*** 
AR (1) (p) 
-6.72 
(0.000)*** 
-7.092 
(0.000)*** 
-6.10 (0.000)*** -6.43 (0.000)*** 
AR (2) (p) 0.552 (0.581) 1.093 (0.275) 1.125 (0.261) 1.461 (0.144) 
Sargan test (p) 194.6 (0.202) 195.1 (0.217) 196.5 (0.261) 197.8 (0.274) 
Dependent variable is FDI 1 or FDI 2. The standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity are reported 
in the parentheses. Wald statistic tests the joint significance of estimated coefficients; 
asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of no relationship. AR(1) and AR(2) are the first 
and second order autocorrelation of residuals, respectively; which are asymptotically distributed as 
N(0,1) under the null of no serial correlation. Sargan Test is the test of over identifying 
restrictions, asymptotically distributed as χ2(df) under the null of instruments' validity. We tested 
for the endogeneity of firm-specific factors using the ‗Difference-in- Sargan-Hansen" statistic, for 
which the null hypothesis states that the variable is exogenous. The results show that, except Firm 
age, Advertising and Personal share, all other firm-specific factors should be treated as 
endogenous. We lose one year because of taking differences and two years as the instruments are 
at date t-2. Hence, for a company to be included in the GMM regressions they should have at least 
3 consecutive years‘ data. This leaves us a sample with 490 firms and 2,062 observations. (*), (**) 
and (***) indicates that the coefficients are significant or the relevant null is rejected at the 10, 5 
and 1 percent level, respectively. 
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in China is positively associated with export intensity and labour cost. On the other hand, we find 
that there are various firm-specific factors that reduce FDI in China. For instance, firm 
profitability, firm age, technology and product innovativeness affect inversely FDI levels. In 
addition, the ownership structure of investment (i.e., personal capital) reveals that higher capital 
share at non-personal level is associated with more FDI. The factors capital intensity and 
advertising activities, however, do not seem to be influencing significantly FDI decisions of EU 
firms. This study finds that FDI is linked significantly to R&D activities and firm size but in a 
non-linear way (reverse-U shape). That is, FDI and R&D, and FDI and size are positively 
correlated in case of ‗when R&D activities are not very intense, and when firms are smaller‘, 
respectively. However, further increases in R&D or in firm size make these relations negative. 
 The country-specific factors shows that lower corruption levels (more relevant for the 
post-WTO period), increase in market size, and lower quality in ‗rule of law‘ promote more FDI 
into China. As for the exchange rate movements, the depreciation of renminbi is leading to lower 
FDI.  
 Pooled OLS, fixed effects, random effects and GMM estimation methods have been used 
to check the robustness of the findings. The results suggest that the issues related to endogeneity, 
partial adjustment and heterogeneity can affect the regression results and hence should be 
controlled for. In particular, using the partial adjustment mechanism, the GMM results suggest 
that EU firms tend to adjust the relative level of their FDI into China. 
In summary, our study reveals that EU investment in China is not only determined by 
standard firm-specific variables but also influenced by location-specific factors. The results could 
serve as a prescription for policy makers at the firm level in the formulation of employment and 
investment strategies, such as the creation of clusters and industrial parks, and could also provide 
guidance for investors wanting to invest in the China.  
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APPENDIX 
Figure A1: EU Realized FDI & Number of Projects in China 1986-2008 (Source: MOFTEC) 
 
 
Figure A2: Percentage of EU FDI in Total FDI in China 1998-2008 (Source: MOFTEC) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure A3:  EU, Japan and U.S. Realized FDI in China 1998-2008 (Source: MOFTEC) 
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Appendix A: ‘study on the opportunities and challenges in EU-China Trade and Investment 
Relations 2006-2010’ pub. March 2007 
EU Trade Commissioner, Peter Mandelson said the strategic review would focus on "key 
challenges such as intellectual property, market access issues and investment opportunities‖, 
―European companies face substantial market access barriers to trade and investment in China. 
These barriers cost EU firms more than € 21.4billion a year in massed business opportunities 
(European Commission, 2007:4). (See figure 1)   Figure. Market Access obstacles for European 
Companies Source: European Commission, 2007:4 European 
Commission ‗study on the Future opportunities and challenges in EU-China Trade and Investment 
Relations 2006-2010‘ pub. March 2007. 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2007/february/tradoc_133299.pdf 
 
